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Japan is ending the 20th century a disappointed nation. Domestic and overseas 
commentators can hardly fail to point out the demoralization of the present and the 
diminishmg expec阻tionsof the future Attempts to talk up the prospects for the economy 
or to suggest new goals for a dispirited state a陪 metwith considerable scepticism. The 
view that Japan’s best years may now be behind it is widespread Pessimism is自己eding
on itself. "' 
Historians. however, are expected to offer a more balanced perspective than the 
editorial writer and the political party spokesman. The understandable concerns of 
Japanese society in the face of the economic dislocations of the 1990s deserve to be 
placed in a broader, more comprehensive context. To be obsessed with today’s Yen. 
Dollar exchange rate and the forecasts of the Economic Planning Agency for the next 
fiscal year is to behave ahistorically. To fear for the future without regard to Japan’s 
achievements over the past half century is to act irrationally Greater knowledge of what 
has gone right (and wrong) for postwar Japan is urgently required both to stem the 
absurdities of some authors and to gently suggest that even the gloomiest predictions for 
the early 2 lst centu叩 are highly re日間suring-or at least ought to be -when contrasted 
with the poverty and powerlessness of the Japan that emerged out of the blitzed cities of 
the Pacific War.山
What Japan needs today JS a large dose of contemporary history. It badly requires 
accurate knowledge of how its society has evolved in the recent past and how its 
neighbours and the wider world have had to cope with comparable issues that Japanese 
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society has also faced More history阻dmore comparative history are called for ; les 
self-anxiety and special pleading might then emerge to offer at least a degree of 
reassurance to a nation in danger of losmg its confidence and cohesion. 
Japan’s present difficulties are hardly in dispute. rn Its failu田 overthe past decade to 
crank start its economy and to tackle m earnest its very considerable financial faults is 
undemable. It is also inevitable that the issues will persist into the next century with 
recent think tanks suggestmg th剖economicgrowth wil be retarded until 2008. "' 
Against such widely recognized pessimism it is important that some sense of 
perspective be rapidly adopted. For the Japanese government, its officialdom and senior 
industrialists al to acknowledge the current crisis but .to remain incapable of gaining an 
economic recovery is disappointmg but to imagine that the 1990s have proved an 
unmitigated disaster for Japanese society is an absurdity. Growth may be negative but 
contemporary Japan remains very much the exceptional nation in the Asian-Pacific 
region and the second lar且esteconomy in the world. Even a dimmished Japan is an 
economic superpower, even a Japan with huge non-performmg loans and rising 
unemployment is a stable, functionmg open society. '" 
Electorates, by definition, are impatient in any democracy where competing political 
groupings a問 anxiousto問spondto public unease and thereby gain power. Successive 
prime mmisters in the past decade there have been seven from Kaifu Toshiki to Obuchi 
Keizo have pledged to solve Japan’s economic woes but their failures are testimony 
both to the obduracy of the problem and the need continually to offer new personalities to 
present at least the prospect of improvement. Different cabmets under a variety of 
political coalitions have al failed. The evidence is far from conclusive that Mr Obuch1 
will be the eventual saviour of the Japanese economy , his term in of自ceIS likely to end 
abruptly in 1999山 ifhe is seen to be as ineffectual as his many, short -lived 
predecesso四
Yet the paradox remams. Japan’s economy exhibits few signs of real growth but its 
Dechm>m ond Contempomy fapon 3 
standing in international league tables remains firm. The economy may be weak wtth 
consumption faltering and financial institutions reluctant to extend credit lines but the 
cumulative strengths of the Japanese economy are impressive. Japan’s per capita GDP is
the highest among the G-7 group of advanced industrial nations (the figure needs though 
to be adjusted downwards on a purchasing power parity basis), while its nominal GDP 
(lower, of course, than the United States) is far in excess of Germany, ts nearest rival. 
When trade balances and foreign currency reserves are also factored into the assessment, 
the position looks even more田assurmg."' 
On objective grounds, therefore, t is indeed permi叩 blefor the senior economic 
bureaucrat Sakakibara Eisuke to term the current situation“a masochistic depression”凶
The faults of the domestic economy have been rehearsed so frequently and the culpnts 
戸iiioriedso repeatedly that it is litle wonder that the public adopts this attitude 
Inevitably, the avalanche of publicity on the weakening of the economy has fed on itself 
and the reluctance of both individual consumers to spend and co叩orat旧nsto invest has 
further destabilized the situation. Publtc scepticism over statements by officials and 
politicians altke on the future improvement of the economy a陀 treatedin exactly the kind 
of manner best guaranteed to delay re叩 very.By the spring of 1999 neither monetary nor 
fiscal measures appear to be much nearer gaining success and the Obuchi government's 
prime polttical aim appears to be to prevent the collapse of any additional banks川 This
highly defensive strategy hardly presents the public with a display of confidence or 
suggests that many new ideas are m the offing 
The contrast with 1989 is sha中andwounding to the nation’s psyche. A decade ago it 
was an eager Japan that sensed the future might indeed lead to‘the Japanese century’and 
that‘Japan’s political power will nse as it provides more aid and invests mo日 andmo問
around the world＇.叫 Adecade ago Ishihara Shintaro wrote an agenda for American 
reform, today it would be htghly presumptuous for any Japanese polttician to offerr 
policy recommendations to its ally on deficit financmg, industrial productivity, itfetime 
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employment or co中orateinvestment policies. Ishihara’s boast that ‘Japan is outpacing 
the United States’山 hasnow be叩 firmlyreversed. Ezra Vogel’s suggestion of a 'Pax 
Nipponica’looks equally far-fetched. Other Asian nations have further compounded 
Japan’s indigmty by exh1bitmg faster growth由roughoutmost of the 1990s and some at 
least appear better placed to rebound from the difficulties seen throughout the Asian-
Pacific region in the late 1990s. '"' 
Yet Japan possesses considerably more national assets than any of its Asian 
neighbours (only Singapore 1s presently classified as a developed economy）皿dlikewise 
the economic fortunes of many European nations are constrained by continuing high 
unemployment and the probability of deflation in the near and medium term.叩 Itis 
only when Japan nostalgically recalls its own era of high 呂田wthand makes mstinctive 
comparisons with the Umted Sates that 1t has quasi legitimate grounds for a degree at 
least of self-commisseration. 
Such comparisons, however, with Japan’s own past and its perfoηnance vis-a-vis the 
United States, while understandable on grounds perhaps of conventional national 
perception, are essentially unhelpful. Contemporary Japan would be well advised to scrap 
such myopic exercises, smce they contnbute litle to any intelligent debate on where 
Japan goes next or serve much use in reminding the public of its remarkable postwar 
climb out of absolute poveny to relative af日uence.川
It 1s only when the Japan田eexperience in the 1990s is put on the scales and weighed 
with the rest of the nation’s baggage over the past five and a half decades that a more 
ac印 rateverdict emerges. The test for contemporary Japan ought to be to ask how the 
nation has performed since the triple humiliation of defeat, surrender and Allied 
occupation, in the late summer of 1945. To imagine that tl】陀eyears of negative growth m 
1998-200 I cancel out the achievements of the past three generations is to underlme the 
incompleten田sof much of the current debate. Equally, the overattentiveness to gaining 
equality or possibly some superiority through “catching up”with the United States is 
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debilitating. '"' The defferences in history, demography, geography and global roles 
preclude most useful comparisons between the two societies. 
Postwar Japan’s history 1s sw gen四日 It bares litle or no substantial comparison to 
either the United States or any state in the Asia-Pacific region The only possible bench 
marks for comparative studies might be with other G-7 nations who also shar怠 alliance
relationships with Washmgton, though the glaring contrasts in social organization and 
cultural behaviour make even these Euro-Japanese studies problematic Contemporary 
Genmany and Japan have had few commonalities beyond a wish for national regeneration 
and economic reconstruction. 
It is best to concentrate on Japan alone and to do so, it is strongly suggested, within a 
wider histoncal time frame than some p問fer.It is the centrality of urgent and prolonged 
economic and national recovery through a mixed economy that aptly symbolizes Japan’s 
own vers旧nof its accomplishments since 1945 The insistence on what the Special 
Survey Committee of the Ministry of Fo日ignA何回目 inSeptember 1946 held to be‘a 
new structure in the fields of finance, industry, agncultu肥， andcommerce’＇＂＇ has been 
largely applied. Economic democratization, albeit heavily reliant m the fi四ttwo postwar 
decades on bureaucratic pressure and pe四uasion,and economic recovery, also with large 
doses of admmistrative guidance from the economic ministries, have realized huge 
benefits for the state and its citizenry. It was an urgent case of national salvation through 
hard work and careful plannmg 
It was therefore possible for the Japanese public to take pnde in its unprecedented 
economic great leap forward. The hypergrowth of the late 1950s and the 1960s and the 
stil highly respectable showings of the post-oil shock, pre-bubble era could be eulogized 
by the late 1980s in multivolume international works. Scholars spoke now of 'the 
Japanese model of political economy’＇＂＇ and Western journalists reported from Tokyo 
on‘the risen sun’＂＇ The fact that Japan’s new found economic and financial successes 
pre口pitateda senes of major trade disputes with the United States and European nations 
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was evidence indeed of both Japan’s achievements and the realities of uncomfortable 
adjustments that had next to be worked out in the旧ternationaleconomic system. '" 
Japanese and outsiders alike were obliged in the process to remind themselves that 
capitalism was a mansion with many different rooms and that accusations of unfair 
practice and differing cultural traits made for some very unpleasant and highly public 
diplomacy 
It was in the 1980s that concern grew in the West over the future role of Japan in the 
international arena. Although Okita Saburo and others would on occasion explain that 
Japan’s economic successes were but temporary and that Western perc叩tionsmight alter 
as the Japanese “miracle”was itself replaced by a more mature phenomenon, this proved 
cold comfort to audiences abroad Concern for the United States’position was expressed 
by Paul Kennedy when he cautioned in his best-seller The Rise and Fa// of the G1叫
ん附口 that'decision makers in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact 
that the sum total of the United States’global interests and obligations is nowadays far 
larger than the countrγs power to defend the al simultaneously’｛初＇ Shortly afterwards 
the Japanese government pointed out to the United States that Tokyo had a considerable 
agenda of its own over the problems facing the US economy and warned that faults in 
Japan’s economic structu問 neededto be balanced by the US side’s awareness of its 
federal budget deficit, poor savings ratio and protected agricultural sector.山＇Not 
surprisingly, US Japan relations suffered It was hard for non Pacific observe四 notto 
fel that the United States resented Japan's rapid acquisition of first economic and then 
financial power and saw Tokyo’s success as highly disruptive to American order in the 
world. 
By the early 1990s, however, the debate began to shift International events conspired 
to leave the United States in a stronger rather than a weaker position as the Cold War’s 
bipolar system collapsed and the Bush administration led the coalition forces to victorγ 
in the Gulf war. While the United States rapidly began to see an improvement in its 
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economic performance, Japan was submerged by the financial consequences of the 
burstmg of its asset-driven “bubble”economy. The boot was now on the other foot After 
years of self-doubt and legitimate criticism from Japan and other foreign states, 1t was 
now Washington’s tum to enjoy a fresh period of supremacy. The hegemon had returned. 
There is no longer much possibility of Japan being able to point to American faults or 
to enjoy the pleasur，出ofclaiming a larger role in both bilateral ti出 toWashington and in 
the wider world. The 1990s have tended to see a diminution in Japan’s horizons and at 
least a temporary ce'5ation of its bid for greater international recognition. 
There is, for example, no present attention to gaining a seat as a permanent member of 
the Umted Nations Security Council and it is now the case that Japan’s financial 
contributions to overseas aid funds have begun to decrease m the wake of its economic 
difficulties '"' Foreign policy appears to have been問legatedto the marginal position It 
possessed in the early postwar era. The slowness with which the possible transfer of 
bases withm Okinawa has proceeded and the continuing delays over substantive 
agreement on US Japan defense cooperation guidelines is hardly indicative of a state 
about to voluntarily undertake new responsib!lities Economic dislocation is only paロof
the explanation for Japan’s present dilatoriness on security mattm but the need to 
concentrate tl1e political mind on more urgent economic matters can hardly be ignored 
Given the scale of Japan's difficulties how then should the nation be assessed at 
century’s end? How can the historian best balance the undeniable sense of crisis in 1999 
with the immense improvements of Japanese society when compared with 1939, 1949 or 
even 1979 ? First, it might be useful to note the triple humiliations of 1945 and sugg田t
that by the early 1960s it was possible to see the establishment of a more democratic and 
wealthier society that had by the 1990s earned the right to laud the triple successes of 
rep目sentativegovernment, opportumties for so口almobility and a deepening affluence 
There can be few societies anywhere who can begin to match the improvement m livmg 
standards exhibited by Japan旧thepast half century or equally are entitled to point to 
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close parallels wllh the non aggressive nature of Tokyo ’s external policies. 
Unfortunately, however, when 1 comes to offering adequate explanations for Japan’s 
achievements there is frequently a temptation within Japan to downplay the invaluable 
roles of the United States in preparing the groundwork both for Jap叩’seconomic and 
fo日1gnpolicy successes. (Overseas audiences may well be guilty of an equally false 
assertion that Japan’s postwar history was“made in the USA”） The vital contribution 
of the Occupation reforms to the future direction of Japanese society is not always 
recalled or the contrast underlined with what almost certainly would have been highly 
timid alterations to the Imperial system, parliamentary government, industrial 
organizations and labour relations. 
It is only by indicating the substantial progr＇田smade by Japan in the last five decades 
that a possible corrective to the execessive self-criticism engendered by economic 
stagnation and deflation is realizable. Given the continuing slump, however, it is hard to 
imagine that any such attempt will find more than a highly limited audience Even 
commentators who point out the size of the Japanese economy and its vast savings pool 
fel obliged to stress economic mismanagement, government問gulatorγpowers,policy 
e汀orsand the lack of transparency m the political economy.明＇ Yet the attempt deserves 
to be made. To underestimate contempor町yJapan is as unhelpful as the past e旺ortsto 
exaggerate its stature. To imagine that Tokyo is fated to remam entrapped by an 
underperforming economy and must continue as a hesitant actor in the Asia Pacific 
region and mtemational organizations is to retreat mto an inappropriate detennimsm. ＇山
Accurate appreciation of the past ought to throw light on the p肥sentand serve to remind 
us that the future is yet open Declinism is a false god 
ENDNOTES 
(!) The secondary literature is vast Any comprehensive account would have to note not 
only the economic and financial tunnoil but the social dislocation of unemployment, 
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reduced educational opportunities and homelessness. Reliable historical accounts 
are not yet available. 
For forceful comment on the continuing problems Japan will have to face in the 
future see remarks by Deputy Secretary of the US Treasury Larry Summers, 
Financial Times, 27β8 February 1999. See also a series of articles under the title of 
Japan’s cns1s in Japan Echo, February 1999, mcluding Kojima Akira's‘Gettmg to 
the Bottom of Japan’s Economic Blues' 
(2) For the longer view see Buckley, Jαpan Today (Cambridge, 1999). On the 
achievements m the Asia-Pacific region see Walter Hatch & Kozo Yamamura As悶
in Japan' s Emhrace ・Building a Regional Production Alliance (C白nbridge,1996) 
Nakamura Takafusa employs the phrase ‘economic superpower’from as early as the 
late 1960s. See Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy (Tokyo, 1981) pp.209, 
211 214. 
(3) Note the openmg sentence of the Japan Echo collection of essaysゾJapancontinues 
to struggle with a stubborn economic recession of unprecedented d1mens10ns.’ 
Japan Echo, op cu. 
(4) Report of the Economic Strategy Council, Daily Yomiun and Asahi Evening News, 
27 February 1999. In offering its proposals the Council argued that political 
leadership was vital if the nation was to rebound. 
(5) This is not to suggest that the Japanese state has handled the present cnsis with 
general competence but it is to underline the fact that at the very least debate on the 
nation’s problems has continued. My own view is that the public has been 
remarkably docile and that the ‘stab1hty’noted 1s far from desi悶blein the light of 
bureaucratic and polil!cal eπurs The one exception to this has been the reluctance 
of consume四 tost町tto spend despite official pleas to do so 
(6) p陀 sspeculation in the spring of 1999 saw Mr Obuchi’s fate as resting on whether a 
modicum of growth might be問alizedand a further c叫lapseof a m句orbank could 
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be avmded. 
(7) In March 19唖9Japan’s trade balance stood at$ 126 billion and its current account 
surplus at$ 125 billion. See Tile Economist, 27 March 1999. 
(8) See Buckley op. cit. p 61 
(9) Public pledges to this effect have been given and very considerable government 
fundmg is being made available to strengthen the capital bases of al financial 
institutions 
(10) See Thomas R. Zengage & C. Tait Ratcliffe, The Japanese Centur (Hong Kong 
1988) p.196. 
(1) Shintaro Ishihara Tile Japan that Can Say No (New York, 1991) p.123 Ishihara 
claimed that‘Americans should realize that the modem era is over Their cherished 
beliefs in materialsm, science, and progr田shave borne bitter fruit’He saw the 
defeat in Vietnam and moon exploration as equal evidence of this reality 
(1時 Thismay be true of South Ko問a,Singapore and Hong Kong, though it is P悶matu町
to celebrate the return to nonnalcy yet. 
(13) The weakness of the new Euro cuπency is clear evidence of the difficulties ahead 
for the EU member states. On recommendations where Japan and the EU might 
more closely conperate in global economic afairs see Reinhard Dnfte, A Review of 
EU-Japan Relations (Brussels, 1998) pp 12-13 
(14) See comments by Nobel laureate Amartya K. Sen, Daily Yomiuri, 3 March 1999. 
The need to increase Western political scientists’awareness of Japanese postwar 
theoretical and actual achievements is forcefully argued by David Williams and 
Chalmers Johnson. 
。司 Thewish to debate the entire subject of Japan’s modern identity makes 
consideration of the United States clearly important but to disregard Asian and 
European influences is unhelpful See Japan’s ide1tity Neitil目的eWest nor tile 
East', sponsored by The Japan Forum on Inter-National Relations and Tile Yomiuri 
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S/limbun, Daily Yamiuri, 3 March 1999 On issues of social policy, education or 
public finance 1t has long become instinctive to view the practices of the United 
States as a convement yardstick with which to compare contemporary Japan 
(16) Postwar Reconstruction of the Japanese Economy (Tokyo, 1992) p.108 The 
origmal text was compiled by Okita Saburo, who contributed an introduction to the 
reprinted text. Okita noted that 'the postwar economic system was basically close to 
a planned economy and very far from a free market economy’ 
（！司 Essayby Yasusuke Murakami in Kozo Yamamura & Yasukichi Yasuba (eds), The 
Political Economy of Japan, vol 1 (St叩 ford,1987) 
臼司 See Far Eastern Economic Review (Cover), 13 June 1985 
（！骨 Althoughsome problems undoubtedly remain, the bulk of the agenda can be said to 
belong to the past. Further increases in Japan's trade imbalance could alter the 
relatively benign era of the late 1990s 
白骨 Kennedy’s publishe四 choseto print this statement on the back cover of his book 
Kennedy himself had relatively litle to say on Japan’s futu問。 SeePaul Kennedy, 
The Rise and Fall of the Gr四rPowers (New York, 1987) pp 458-471. 
~！） On trade diplomacy see Buckley, US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945 1990 
(Cambridge, 1992) pp 138-152. 
白2) See comments by ShiリuroOgata, Financial Times, 5 January 1996 He pointed out 
that‘Japan's maturing economy may have peaked just as it is reaching for that 
larger international role' 
闘 See,however, Toyoo Gyohten’S view that Japan has suffered exc田sivelyfrom 
exchange rate fluctuations in Yomi1川 Shimb叫ん同producedin Daily Yomiari, 25 
January 1999. Gyohten was prepared to admit that‘Japan has not been a willing 
pa出口pantin international endeavours to stabilize the exch四 gemarket’ 
似） The former Japanese ambassador to Washington has warned that the ending of the 
Cold War has left both sides unclear as to how to redefine the US Japan alliance. 
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Ambassador Kuriyama was speaking at SAIS in Washington, 11 November 1998. 
He argued for greater p陪cisionby both governments so that electorates m Japan and 
the USA may see why the alliance contmues to matter 
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“Declinism”と現代日本
ロジャー ノミックレイ
く要約〉
1990年代における日本の経済不振は、国内外の多くの評論家に日本の将来展
望に対する疑問をいだかせるようになった。この論文では、“declinism”が現代
日本の本質的な経済・金融の基盤を無視するとき、それは有益な構想ではない、
ということを議論する。 1945年以後の日本の発展を顧みることで、日本を衰退
の一途をたどる運命と論じる日本経済終需論は相殺されるのである。
